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Abstract 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF SEC COMMENTS ON OTHER FIRM ACTIVITIES 
 
Kristin Mary Stack, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation investigates the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) filing review process on firms’ activities. Prior academic research has documented several 
benefits of the SEC filing review process, yet anecdotal evidence suggests a previously 
undocumented effect: SEC comment letters draw on firms’ constrained resources, resulting in 
spillover effects on other firm activities. About 64 percent of all periodic SEC comment letters are 
unlikely to identify misapplication of accounting standards. Using Naïve Bayesian textual 
classification, I identify these SEC comment letters, and using a large sample of U.S. firms, I show 
that firms react to them. Consistent with comment letters having spillover effects on other firm 
activities, I predict and find that firms are less timely in their earnings announcements, less likely 
to issue quarterly management guidance, and less likely to issue debt during quarters in which they 
are responding to an SEC comment letter, even when the comment letter fails to detect 
misapplication of accounting standards. Cross sectional analyses suggest that this effect is stronger 
for comment letters that take longer to resolve, for firms with fewer financial reporting resources, 
and for more unpredictable comment letters. This study provides initial empirical evidence that 
SEC comment letters impose on CFOs a tradeoff between remediation and other firm activities, 
even on CFOs that are in compliance with accounting regulation. This result should be of interest 
to regulators, practitioners, and academics. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In this study, I investigate whether and how firms divert resources away from important 
activities, such as timely earnings announcements, voluntary disclosure, and debt financing, when 
they receive Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters. The SEC’s Division of 
Corporation Finance reviews the financial statement filings of every publicly listed firm at least 
once every three years. This filing review process serves as a form of financial reporting oversight, 
and its purpose is to ensure that firms are in compliance with disclosure and accounting regulations. 
When the SEC identifies issues that warrant clarification, potential disclosure errors, or potential 
deficiencies during the review, it issues a comment letter to the firm with a list of questions, and 
the firm must either update its disclosure and its application of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) or defend the appropriateness of its disclosure and accounting choices. Prior 
research has documented several benefits of the SEC’s comment letter process, including 
improvements in firms’ disclosure quality (Bozanic, Dietrich, and Johnson 2017), firms’ 
information environment (Johnston and Petacchi 2017), and industry peers’ risk disclosure quality 
(Brown, Tian, and Tucker 2018).  
Recent findings in the growing SEC comment letter literature identify a large subset of 
SEC comment letters that do not lead to financial statement amendments or uncover strategically 
withheld firm information. This subset represents the majority of SEC comment letters (about 
75%). While prior research has documented several benefits of comment letters that uncover non-
compliance, research on any impact to firms of receiving a comment letter that does not uncover 
non-compliance is scant. Further, focusing on comment letters that do not uncover non-compliance 
enables researchers to study the firm’s behavior while remediating the comment letter separate 
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from the firm’s behavior while addressing their underlying non-compliance issues.1 To remediate 
a comment letter, a firm is required to answer all comments in a satisfactory manner, often 
requiring multiple rounds of correspondence and spanning several weeks. Cassell, Dreher, and 
Myers (2013) argue that SEC comment letters are costly to firms because internal resources are 
required for remediation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that practitioners agree with this assertion; 
several consulting and legal firms advise that firms immediately dedicate internal resources 
(including personnel) to remediation when they receive a comment letter (e.g., Day and Prusse 
2018; Wienmen and Carnall 2016). Further, Johnson (2010) argues that SEC comment letters 
become CFOs’ priority, creating spillover effects for other activities to which the CFO would 
otherwise devote resources.2 The argument that even SEC comment letters that do not uncover 
non-compliance significantly draw on firm and manager resources appears in both academic 
studies and anecdotal evidence, yet to date there is no empirical evidence to support this claim.3 In 
fact, most studies on the benefits of SEC comment letters exclude from their empirical analyses 
the quarter or year of SEC comment letter remediation (e.g., Johnston and Petacchi 2017), 
highlighting how little is known about remediation. Just as important, if SEC remediation does 
 
1Anecdotal evidence does not distinguish between the firm resources needed to respond to SEC comment letters that 
do not uncover non-compliance versus SEC comment letters that do uncover non-compliance. I expect spillover 
effects to occur for both. Importantly, I focus on SEC comment letters that do not uncover non-compliance in this 
study because characteristics of these comment letters allow me to attribute my findings to the process of remediation 
itself rather than the firm’s underlying non-compliance issue.  
2 This anecdotal evidence suggests there are two types of costs to the firm: 1) the internal resources needed to respond 
to the letter and 2) the spillover effects on other firm activities when internal resources are reallocated away from 
them. While evidence for either or both types of costs would support the larger claim that SEC comment letters are 
costly to firms, I focus on spillover effects in this study since characteristics of the SEC’s filing review process make 
spillover effects likely (detailed in the hypothesis development) and data is widely available to test for their existence.   
3 Previous studies have focused on benefits of SEC comment letters that detect non-compliance. Nonetheless, I do not 
take the position that SEC comment letters are only beneficial if they uncover non-compliance. It is possible that SEC 
comment letters that do not uncover non-compliance serve as a preventative control mechanism and deter firms from 
non-compliance. This study aims to identify one spillover effect of the subset of SEC comment letters that do not 
uncover non-compliance. I do not study or calibrate their benefits; future research can examine the net benefit or cost 
of these comment letters.  
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have a spillover effect on other activities, it is unknown whether the effect is large enough to 
impact firm-level activities and whether the activities impacted are important from investors’ 
perspective. 4  
Prior literature provides a rationale for expecting spillover effects of SEC comment letter 
remediation. A growing stream of literature suggests that since economic agents have limited time, 
attention, and effort to manage their workload, when their workload increases, performance on 
some activities declines. Prior research on corporate governance finds that busy board members 
are worse monitors, and firms with busy executives have lower performance (e.g., Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Hauser 2018). Other studies examine a 
similar effect on other economic agents, such as financial analysts, auditors, and SEC staff (Aobdia 
2018; Ege, Glenn, and Robinson 2020; Hills, Kubic, and Mayew 2020; Truong 2018). In this study, 
I propose that a firm’s CFO and her staff are also subject to finite time, attention, and effort, and 
if SEC comment letter remediation is a sufficient shock to their workload, firms will exhibit 
reduced performance in other activities under the CFO’s jurisdiction.  
There are at least three reasons why an SEC comment letter could act as a shock to the 
workload of the CFO and her staff, even when the firm is in compliance with accounting 
regulations. First, I expect CFOs to deem SEC comment letter remediation sufficiently important 
because there are consequences to firms that mishandle or ignore comments (Cassell, 
Cunningham, and Lisic 2017). Second, I expect that SEC comment letter remediation can be a 
large, effort-intensive task. On average, SEC comments take a firm 67 days to resolve (31 days of 
firm employee time), requiring 3 rounds of correspondence. The SEC often requires firms to justify 
 
4 The focus of this study is the large subset of SEC comment letters that do not uncover firms’ non-compliance 
with accounting regulation. For expositional purposes, when I refer to “SEC comment letters”, I reference this subset 
of SEC comment letters unless clearly stated otherwise.  
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their application of complex accounting rules on prior financial statements, and they expect 
responses to include discussion, analysis, and citation of applicable accounting standards. Third, I 
expect the arrival of SEC comment letters to be relatively unpredictable. Not all reviews result in 
comment letters, and there are no reliable guidelines for when firms can expect to receive 
comments on their most recently filed 10-K or 10-Q. Thus, it is unlikely that firms keep dedicated 
capacity on hand to handle SEC comment letter remediation. Given these arguments, I hypothesize 
that CFOs divert resources away from normal firm activities and toward remediation when they 
receive (and until they resolve) an SEC comment letter. On the other hand, it is possible that the 
anecdotal evidence shared by CFOs does not represent the average CFO’s experience. It may also 
represent CFOs’ exaggerated claims driven by their dislike for the SEC’s monitoring role. Further, 
if SEC comment letters are unimportant, easy to remediate, or predictable, then I do not expect to 
see changes in firm-level outcomes associated with the presence of an SEC comment letter.  
If, as hypothesized, SEC comment letter remediation draws on firm resources, resulting in 
spillover effects on other firm activities, I predict that firms will be less timely in their earnings 
announcements, less likely to voluntarily issue quarterly guidance, and less likely to undertake 
new debt issuance until they remediate the comment letter. I choose these activities based on three 
criteria. First, these activities are important to investors  (Griffin 2003; Harris and Raviv 1991; 
Welker 1995). Any decline in these activities would negatively impact investors: the very party 
the comment letter process is intended to protect. Second, these activities are likely within the 
jurisdiction of a firm’s CFO (Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2015). Third, these activities are resource 
intensive. Given these characteristics, I posit that these firm activities are reasonable candidates 
for detecting resource tradeoffs during SEC comment letter remediation.  
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To test my hypothesis, I analyze earnings announcement timeliness, voluntary quarterly 
forecast issuance, and new debt issuance activities during firm-quarters in which a firm receives 
an SEC comment letter that is unlikely to uncover non-compliance. I use Audit Analytics to 
identify SEC comment letters that were sent to firms from 2006 to 2017. Following prior literature, 
I focus on comment letters that reference 10-K and 10-Q filings. Following Ryans (2019), I use 
Naïve Bayesian textual classification to identify SEC comment letters that are unlikely to be 
associated with future restatements or write-downs. This technique uses the text from training 
documents to identify the words or groups of words that differentiate comment letters that lead to 
restatements and write downs from those that do not. This process requires at least two years of 
training data, and therefore my sample of comment letters includes comment letters that were 
issued from 2008 to 2017. Unlike prior literature (e.g., Bozanic et al. 2017; Johnston and Petacchi 
2017), I exclude SEC comment letters that are likely to require restatements or write-downs from 
my sample because I aim to identify whether the spillover effects of responding to SEC comments 
also falls on firms whose financial statements are in compliance with accounting rules, not just 
those that are out of compliance. 
I obtain earnings announcement dates from Compustat Quarterly, voluntary forecast data 
from IBES, and debt issuance data from DealScan.5 I classify a firm-quarter as a treatment quarter 
if the firm had to respond to a comment letter from the SEC during that quarter. My control sample 
is all other firm-quarters in the Compustat universe between 2008 and 2017, given that the firm 
received a comment letter at least once during my sample period. To mitigate omitted variable bias 
related to time-invariant firm characteristics, I run ordinary least squares (OLS) models with firm, 
 
5 Thomson Reuters’ DealScan contains bank loan information, including the origination date of private loans. 
Since private loans are issued with higher frequency than public loans (i.e., bonds), I test my hypotheses using 
DealScan to take advantage of higher statistical power.  
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year, and quarter fixed effects; thus, the main source of variation comes from within-firm changes 
between quarters with and without SEC comment letters.  
Results suggest that firms are less timely in their earnings announcements, are less likely 
to issue quarterly forecasts, and are less likely to issue new debt in quarters when they receive a 
comment letter from the SEC, after controlling for relevant firm-level control variables. This 
evidence is consistent with SEC comment letters serving as a shock to CFO workload, diverting 
internal resources away from other important activities until remediation is complete.  
I conduct three cross-sectional tests to provide further support to my hypothesis. First, some 
comment letters require more effort than others, and I expect less effortful comment letter 
conversations to have a smaller impact on workload. Following prior literature (Cassell et al. 
2013), I use the number of quarter-days the firm spent responding to the SEC comment letter as a 
proxy for the effort required to remediate it. As expected, I find that an SEC comment letter’s 
impact on earnings announcement timeliness, forecast issuance, and debt issuance activities 
increases with the number of quarter-days that the firm spends responding to the letter.  
Second, if an SEC comment letter is a resource and effort-intensive task, then for firms that 
have ex ante invested more resources in the firm’s financial reporting function, I expect the effect 
of an SEC comment letter on other important activities to be weaker. To investigate this issue, I 
split the sample into two groups: those with a CFO that also holds the Chief Accounting Officer 
(CAO) title and those with a CFO that does not. If a firm has a CFO that is also the CAO, this may 
indicate that the CFO has fewer resources on hand to deal with the additional workload of 
responding to the SEC’s comments. Consistent with this, I find that the main results only hold in 
the subsample of firms with a CFO that is also the CAO.   
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Third, some SEC comment letters may be more unpredictable than others. I expect that 
more unpredictable comment letters will have a larger impact on earnings announcement 
timeliness, forecast issuance, and debt financing activities than predictable comment letters. To 
investigate this, I separately identify comment letters that have a low predicted likelihood of 
arriving in a given quarter and those with a high predicted likelihood. I find some evidence that 
the spillover effects of more unpredictable SEC comments are larger. Specifically, given that a 
firm receives a comment letter, I find that the impact on earnings announcement timeliness and 
new debt issuance activity is greater for more unpredictable SEC comment letters than for less 
unpredictable SEC comment letters.  
In additional analyses, I first examine whether firms better manage the spillover effects of 
SEC comment letter remediation over time. To examine this, I separately identify a firm’s first 
comment letter and all subsequent comment letters. I find some evidence consistent with firms 
learning over time. Specifically, given that a firm receives a comment letter, I find that the impact 
on earnings announcement timeliness and voluntary disclosure activity is greater for the first 
comment letter than subsequent comment letters. 
Second, I aim to rule out an alternative explanation. It is possible that the comment letters 
in my sample have information content; thus, firms may reduce earnings announcement timeliness, 
forecast issuance, or debt issuance not because remediation requires significant internal resources 
but because they are reacting to the information. Dechow, Lawrence, and Ryans (2016) document 
evidence that some comment letters that address revenue recognition contain information. My 
results hold when I remove all revenue-related comment letters from my sample, providing 
comfort that information content is not driving my main result.  
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Third, I conduct two robustness tests. I first examine whether my results on the issuance of 
management guidance and the issuance of new debt are robust to an alternative model 
specification. I re-run my main analyses using a logistic regression instead of a linear probability 
model, and my results hold, alleviating concerns that my results are driven by model specification. 
I also examine whether my results are robust to an alternative method for classifying the subset of 
SEC comment letters that do not uncover non-compliance. I redefine my sample to include 
comment letters that do not lead to a restatement, amendment, or write down in the year following 
remediation. I re-run all analyses using this definition, and my results hold.  
This study contributes to existing literature on the consequences of the SEC’s filing review 
process. My study provides initial empirical evidence that SEC comment letter remediation draws 
on firms’ constrained resources. Further, I identify specific activities that firms are more likely to 
discontinue when they receive a comment letter: timely earnings announcements, voluntary 
forecast disclosure, and new debt financing. Prior literature has documented negative effects to 
shareholders when firms choose not to engage in these activities (e.g., Bartov and Konchitchki 
2017; Harris and Raviv 1991; Welker 1995). Therefore, while prior literature has documented the 
benefits of SEC comment letters to shareholders, this study documents a potentially unintended 
consequence. In other words, SEC comments impose a complicated tradeoff decision on CFOs, 
even on CFOs that are in compliance with accounting regulations. This finding, in conjunction 
with prior findings on measurable benefits of the SEC filing review process, should be of interest 
to regulators measuring its success. Specifically, while SEC comments that do not detect 
accounting non-compliance may provide an important preventative mechanism, the findings in 
this study suggest they come at a cost. This finding may be useful as the SEC assesses the resources 
that it dedicates to detecting versus preventing financial reporting non-compliance. 
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Second, this study also speaks to a broader question regarding the impact of regulation on 
firms. Attributes of SEC comment letters make them ideal for studying spillover effects of 
accounting regulation, yet they are likely less resource-intensive than other accounting-related 
investigations or regulatory changes. For example, SEC Division of Enforcement investigations 
take longer to remediate and new regulatory requirements under SOX 404 took firms longer to 
implement than the average SEC comment letter conversation. The effects documented in this 
study should be interpreted as initial evidence that the SEC’s filing review process imposes 
tradeoffs on CFOs for constrained firm resources, and effects are likely to be larger under more 
resource-intensive regulation. 
Third, this study makes contributions to the growing literature on resource constraints for 
economic agents. Whereas prior literature has focused on the workloads of other decision-makers 
such as board members, auditors, and analysts, I document consequences of shocks to CFO 
workload. Further, I provide evidence that having a CAO in addition to a CFO could reduce the 
impact of shocks to the CFO’s workload.  
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2.0 Background on SEC Comment Letters 
The SEC’s mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 
and facilitate capital formation” (SEC, 2018). In service of their mission, the Division of 
Corporation Finance conducts regular reviews of financial statements filed under the Securities 
and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. Since 2002, the SEC has been required to review each firm’s 
filings at least once every three years, as mandated by Section 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In 
addition to evaluating the clarity and detail in qualitative disclosures, the SEC evaluates firms for 
compliance with reporting requirements and the reasonableness of the firm’s application of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). If the SEC identifies issues that warrant 
clarification, potential deficiencies, or potential errors during a review, the SEC issues the firm a 
comment letter with a list of all concerns. The SEC’s comments range in severity, some requesting 
evidence that the firm used managerial discretion appropriately when applying a complex 
accounting standard and others requesting that a firm restate prior filings to correct material errors. 
Regardless of severity, the firm must answer the SEC’s comments within 10 business days, where 
the firm can either agree with the SEC’s suggested recourse or negotiate for an alternative outcome. 
Most commonly, firms negotiate for an alternative outcome, and this process often requires 
multiple rounds of correspondence between the firm and the SEC, spanning several weeks.  
Evidence suggests that the SEC is receptive to firms’ clarifications – in 75 percent of SEC 
comment letter conversations, the SEC is ultimately satisfied that the firm correctly applied GAAP 
and does not require the firm to amend, restate, or revise financial statements. Thus, the receipt of 
an SEC comment letter does not itself indicate below-average financial reporting quality; this is 
aligned with the financial statement review process serving an oversight role rather than a 
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traditional enforcement activity (Ryans 2019). Recent literature has classified a large subset of 
comment letters that are unlikely to identify issues in financial reporting (Ryans 2019). Since this 
study is on the remediation of SEC comment letters (and not on enforced financial reporting 
improvements), I focus on this subset of comment letters.  
The following example of a comment letter conversation illustrates some features of the 
typical comment letter that I examine. The SEC reviewed Arbor Realty Trust, Inc.’s December 31, 
2008 10-K (filed March 9, 2009) and its June 30, 2009 10-Q (filed August 7, 2009) and sent an 
initial comment letter on September 29, 2009. As is common, the SEC’s initial comment letter 
addresses Arbor Realty Trust, Inc.’s Chief Financial Officer. The SEC highlights 22 points for the 
CFO to address, and states “if you disagree with our comments, we will consider your explanation 
as to why our comments are not applicable”. The conversation required 4 rounds of letters. 
Appendix A presents an example of the firm’s response to one of the SEC’s 22 numbered points. 
In its response, the firm references the accounting standard that it applied and provides details 
regarding the transaction in question, including a table of data, to support its claim that it correctly 
applied the standard. On May 24, 2010, the SEC agreed that Arbor Realty Trust, Inc. was in 
compliance with accounting standards and completed the review. 
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3.0 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Prior Literature on SEC Comment Letters 
Disclosure of SEC comment letters became widely available for the first time in 2004. 
Since then, research on the filing review process has increased. Prior research on the consequences 
of SEC comment letters documents benefits to firms’ disclosure practices. Johnston and Petacchi 
(2017) find an overall improvement in a firm’s information environment after a comment letter is 
resolved, with lower bid-ask spreads and higher earnings response coefficients. Bozanic et al. 
(2017) similarly document improvements in qualitative disclosure attributes after a comment letter 
is resolved. Benefits from the SEC comment letter are not limited to the firm that receives the 
comment, Brown et al. (2018) document a peer spillover effect, where firms improve risk 
disclosure quality after an industry peer firm receives an SEC comment letter on that topic.  
Anecdotal evidence supports the claim that SEC comment letters are internally resource-
intensive, and that “even if the process goes smoothly, the letters become an instant priority, 
distracting CFOs from other work and costing a sizable sum to boot” (Johnson 2010). Prior 
literature similarly argues that the comment letter process is costly to firms. Cassell et al. (2013) 
model determinants of SEC comment letter remediation costs, proxied by the number days and the 
number of rounds in the comment letter conversation. They lean on anecdotal evidence to support 
their argument that longer response times and more rounds should proxy for firms devoting greater 
internal and external resources to comment letter remediation. The authors note that they are not 
providing direct evidence of resource constraints. In this study, I directly examine whether SEC 
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comment letters draw resources away from firms’ other important activities to provide evidence 
on the spillover effects of comment letters.  
3.2 Prior Literature on Workload 
Prior literature on directors and executives offers a channel through which SEC comment 
letters can have spillover effects on other firm-level outcomes. Prior literature suggests that 
directors and executives have finite time, attention, and effort to manage their workload. When 
their workload increases, performance on some activities declines. For example, a large stream of 
corporate governance research argues that board members with several board positions (called 
‘busy outside directors’) have higher workloads. Core et al. (1999) find that busy outside directors 
are associated with significantly higher CEO pay, suggesting that CEOs are able to extract 
additional compensation from the firm when monitors are busy. Further, overall firm performance 
declines when outside directors hold more than two directorships (Fich and Shivdasani 2006) and 
when outside directors experience a shock to their workload via a merger or acquisition at a 
different firm (Hauser 2018).  
Directors’ performance is not uniquely impacted by workload shocks; Malmendier and 
Tate (2018) find that superstar CEOs spend more time writing books and sitting on outside boards, 
leading to a decline in firm performance at their own firms. Aobdia (2018) finds that auditors’ 
workload increases after their audit engagement receives a Part 1 Finding on their PCAOB 
inspection, and audit quality on their other audit engagements decreases. Ege et al. (2020) 
document that the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance workload increases when they 
unexpectedly receive more transactional filings, and its staff write lower quality periodic comment 
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letters as a result. Similarly, in a concurrent study, Hills, Kubic, and Mayew (2020) find that SEC 
staff workload increases when they regulate state sponsors of terrorism (SST) disclosure, and the 
quality of the staff’s financial reporting oversight decreases. Further, another concurrent study 
examines the impact of workload on analysts; Truong (2018) documents that analysts with a larger 
workload are associated with higher forecast errors.    
In this study, I apply the concept of workload shocks to the CFO and her staff. I expect the 
arrival of an SEC comment letter to increase the workload of a CFO, and her performance in other 
activities will decline as a result.6 Three characteristics of SEC comment letters make it likely that 
they will increase workload: there are significant consequences to ignoring them, they are 
resource-intensive to remediate, and their arrival is relatively unpredictable. I elaborate on each 
characteristic in turn below.  
First, I expect CFOs to deem SEC comment letters important tasks because there are 
documented consequences to shirking. Cassell et al. (2017) show that poorly written comment 
letter responses are more likely to lead to worse outcomes like restatements. Further, if a firm 
ignores a comment letter, the Division of Corporation Finance can escalate it to the SEC’s Division 
of Enforcement, increasing the likelihood of restatements and CFO turnover even further (Hennes, 
Leone, and Miller 2008). 
Second, I expect that SEC comment letter remediation is, on average, a resource-intensive 
task. Comment letters take an average of 67 days and 3 rounds of correspondence to remediate. 
The SEC often requires firms to justify their application of complex accounting rules on prior 
financial statements. Responses often include discussion, analysis, and citation of applicable 
 
6 Given that SEC comment letters are a shock to the CFO’s workload, performance in other activities will decline if, 
on average, firms do not have enough slack in their accounting and finance function to absorb this workload shock.  
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accounting standards, which is illustrated in the sample comment letter response in Appendix A. 
Prior research has documented evidence that CFOs attempt to shorten the time span during which 
they engage in back-and-forth conversation with the SEC by hiring their external auditors to help 
them with their responses (Ballestero and Schmidt 2019). Specifically in the merger and 
acquisition setting, Liu, Shu, Towery, and Wang (2020) provide evidence that an SEC comment 
letter lengthens the amount of time taken to complete a deal.  
Third, I expect the timing of the arrival of SEC comment letters to be relatively 
unpredictable, on average. While Section 408 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requires that the 
SEC reviews each public company’s periodic filings at least once every three years, a company 
may be reviewed more often. Further, not all reviews result in comment letters. As a result, firms 
may receive comment letters two years in a row and subsequently more than three years may pass 
without no comment letter. Even if a firm could reliably predict that it will receive a comment 
letter in a given year, there are no guidelines for the timing within the year that firms can expect 
to receive comments on their most recently filed 10-K or 10-Q. Thus, it is unlikely that firms keep 
dedicated capacity on hand to handle SEC comment letter remediation. 
Given the above arguments, I expect SEC comment letters to increase CFOs’ workload 
such that CFOs divert time, effort, and attention away from other normal activities and toward 
SEC comment letter remediation. On the other hand, it is possible that the anecdotal evidence 
shared by CFOs does not represent the average CFO’s experience; the average CFO may have 
enough slack in the accounting and finance function to absorb the workload associated with 
remediation. Further, CFOs who dislike the SEC’s monitoring role might exaggerate the costs of 
the SEC’s filing review process in an effort to convince the SEC to reduce its level of monitoring. 
If it is true that the anecdotal evidence simply represents CFOs’ exaggerated claims, and SEC 
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comment letters are unimportant, easy to remediate, or predictable, then I do not expect to see 
changes in firm-level outcomes associated with the presence of an SEC comment letter.  
To investigate this, I choose to examine three firm-level activities: earnings announcement 
timeliness, quarterly voluntary disclosure, and debt financing.   
3.3 First Proxy for Firm Activity: Earnings Announcement Timeliness 
The timeliness of quarterly earnings announcements is an important firm activity from the 
perspective of investors (Beaver 1968; Givoly & Palmon 1982). Delays in earnings 
announcements affect the timeliness of accounting information, which has documented adverse 
consequences such as higher information asymmetry and lower abnormal returns (e.g., Chambers 
and Penman 1984).  
In addition to earnings announcement timeliness being an important firm activity to 
investors, it is also a reasonable candidate for detecting resource tradeoffs upon the arrival of an 
SEC comment letter. First, accurate and timely financial reporting is likely within the CFO’s 
jurisdiction. While Sarbanes Oxley requires both the CEO and the CFO to certify the financial 
information on the firm’s financial statements, the quarter financial statement closing process is 
still likely driven predominantly by CFO effort (Indjejikian & Matějka 2009). Second, the quarter 
closing process is a resource-intensive task. Anecdotal evidence in a 2020 CFO Magazine article 
states, “…as any public firm CFO knows, the financial close is a necessary part of business, yet 
among the most arduous of tasks” (Soderberg 2020).  
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Based on the above arguments, I expect that earnings announcement timeliness is a suitable 
candidate for investigating the spillover effects of SEC comment letters. I state the following 
hypothesis in alternative form:  
H1a: Earning announcement timeliness decreases when a firm receives an SEC comment 
letter. 
3.4 Second Proxy for Firm Activity: Voluntary Disclosure Activity 
For similar reasons, I also investigate whether CFOs divert resources away from voluntary 
disclosure activities upon the arrival of an SEC comment letter. Voluntary disclosure is an 
important firm activity from the perspective of investors. For example, Welker (1995) documents 
reductions in information asymmetry and increased liquidity among firms that consistently 
forecast. Similarly, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that German firms that commit to higher 
voluntary disclosure levels see a reduction in bid-ask spreads. In all, a rich stream of literature on 
voluntary disclosure suggests that, if SEC comment letters pull CFO resources away from 
voluntary forecast issuance activities, investors will be affected.  
In addition to voluntary disclosure being an important firm activity, it is also reasonable to 
expect that CFOs divert resources away from voluntary disclosure activities upon the arrival of an 
SEC comment letter for the following reasons. First, voluntary disclosure decisions are within the 
jurisdiction of the CFO. Recent research has documented evidence that CFOs have influence over 
a firm’s voluntary disclosure policy. Graham et al. (2015) identify CFOs as the chief decision-
maker in voluntary disclosure decisions and surveys CFOs to learn more about this activity. 
Further, Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010) empirically test whether CFOs influence firms’ quarterly 
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voluntary disclosure using a manager fixed-effects model and find evidence that the CFO’s role is 
statistically and economically significant.  
Second, voluntary disclosure activity is resource intensive. In order to voluntarily disclose 
information, CFOs must first internally generate forecasts, a difficult and effortful task. Goodman, 
Neamtiu, Shroff, and White (2014)  argue that forecasting requires CFOs to 1) collect reliable, 
internally-generated data and relevant information on the external environment, and 2) process and 
synthesize the information collected. Both requirements call for managerial attention. A long 
stream of literature documents the skill and effort needed to build and maintain a sound internal 
control system that generates reliable information needed for forecasting (e.g., Feng, Li, and 
McVay 2009; Hoitash, Hoitash, and Johnstone 2012; Li, Sun, and Ettredge 2010).  
Based on the above arguments, I expect that voluntary disclosure activity is a suitable 
candidate for investigating the spillover effects of SEC comment letters. I state the following 
hypothesis in alternative form:  
H1b: Voluntary disclosure activity decreases when a firm receives an SEC comment letter. 
3.5 Third Proxy for Firm Activity: New Debt Financing 
For similar reasons, I also investigate whether CFOs divert resources away from debt 
financing activities upon the arrival of an SEC comment letter. Any changes in debt issuance 
activity is important to investors. Whether firms choose a different source to fund investment 
opportunities or choose to delay investment until the SEC comment letter is resolved, if a firm 
makes capital structure changes because of a CFO with an increased workload rather than a change 
in firm fundamentals, this can lead to suboptimal investment returns and lower firm performance. 
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Prior literature has documented several benefits to investors when firms optimally structure their 
debt, including the ability to take advantage of tax shields, reductions in information asymmetry, 
and the opportunity to discipline entrenched executives (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980; Harris and 
Raviv 1991; Stulz 1990). In sum, a rich stream of literature on firm capital structure suggests that, 
if SEC comment letters pull CFOs’ resources away from optimal debt issuance activity, investors 
will be worse off.  
Further, it is reasonable to expect that CFOs divert resources away from debt financing 
activities upon the arrival of an SEC comment letter. First, corporate financing decisions also fall 
under the jurisdiction of the CFO. Graham and Harvey (2001) identify CFOs as the chief decision-
maker in firms’ capital budgeting decisions. Further, Graham et al. (2015) provide survey evidence 
that capital structure policies are most likely to be delegated from the CEO to the CFO.  
Second, a large stream of research documents the complexity behind firms’ investment and 
capital structure decision-making. When faced with a new investment opportunity, firms must 
analyze the viability of the opportunity and then decide how to finance it, and prior research 
suggests that these activities require significant effort from executives. Further, Graham and 
Harvey (2001) document wide variation in complexity among the analyses that CFOs rely on when 
making investing and financing decisions, suggesting that firms carefully consider the level of 
effort that is needed to complete the task. Finally, even once the decision to issue debt is made, 
execution requires the CFO to engage with a lender, gather and share information, negotiate terms, 
and approve the final deal. Thus, when resources are diverted away from the effort-intensive debt 
issuance process, I expect firms’ debt financing activity will decrease. I state the following 
hypothesis in alternative form:  
H1c: Debt financing activity decreases when the firm receives an SEC comment letter. 
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4.0 Data, Main Variable Definitions, and Research Design 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
I use Audit Analytics to identify comment letter conversations that initiated between 2006 
and 2017.7 In 2004, the SEC made public all comment letter correspondence between the firm and 
the SEC. I start with all comment letter conversations where the first letter references a 10-K or 
10-Q filing, and I require that all conversations are resolved by December 31, 2018. Unlike with 
transactional filings (e.g., S-1 for IPOs and S-4 for acquisitions), with 10-K and 10-Q filings, firms 
are unsure in any given year if the SEC will review them, and even less sure that they will receive 
a comment letter. Thus, comment letters that arise out of 10-K and 10-Q filings are well suited to 
test my hypotheses since their arrival is relatively unpredictable to firms.  
I further require that comment letters in my sample are unlikely to uncover financial 
reporting non-compliance. This requirement allows me to examine the spillover effects of SEC 
comment letter remediation process itself rather than the spillover effects of the likely outcomes 
of the comment letter. Following Ryans (2019), I use Naïve Bayesian textual classification to 
identify comment letters that are unlikely to lead to restatements or write-downs. This technique 
uses the text from training documents to identify the words or groups of words that differentiate 
 
7 Following prior literature (e.g., Ballestero and Schmidt 2019; Cassell et al. 2013), I identify comment letters 
with substantive information by dropping observations in Audit Analytics that refer to cover letters, letters with no 
new information, duplicate letters, or tandy letters (identified if the variable “iss_whote_tkeys” equals “1109”, “903”, 
“1257”, or “928”, respectively).  
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comment letters that lead to restatements and write downs from those that do not. It generates an 
algorithm which can then predict the likelihood that a comment letter in the testing sample signals 
financial reporting quality concerns. A comment letter is classified as unlikely to uncover non-
compliance if the likelihood that it leads to restatement or write down is less than the likelihood 
that it does not. One benefit of this classification technique is that I classify SEC comment letters 
using the same information that firms have while in remediation; thus, it is not subject to look-
ahead bias. On the other hand, one concern is that there may be SEC comment letters in my sample 
which are deemed unlikely to uncover non-compliance, yet the firm later has a restatement or 
write-down. While Ryans (2019) runs validation tests that provide comfort in the legitimacy of 
this algorithm for classification purposes, I address this limitation and demonstrate that results are 
robust to an alternative classification technique in an additional analysis.  
My training sample begins with 2006 and 2007 comment letters, which are used to classify 
2008 comment letters. The training sample is updated for every testing year, where 2006 – 2008 
comment letters are trained to test 2009 comment letters, 2006 – 2009 comment letters are trained 
to test 2010 comment letters, etc. This procedure is repeated through test year 2017.8 Table 1, 
Panel A provides details on sample selection for the SEC comment letter conversation sample. The 
Naïve Bayesian textual classification procedure classifies 10,055 periodic comment letter 
conversations issued between 2008 and 2017. Of those, 3,647 were likely to lead to future 
restatements or write downs. I remove these comment letters from the sample. There remain 6,408 
comment letter conversations, representing 3,728 unique firms. 
 
8 I use a maximum of five trailing years to train for any given test year. 
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I merge Audit Analytics comment letter data with Compustat to get a panel dataset with all 
firm quarters from 2008-2017, resulting in 171,225 firm-quarter observations where each firm 
received at least one comment letter during my sample period. This restriction mitigates concerns 
that firms which receive comment letters are fundamentally different from firms that do not receive 
comment letters in unobservable ways. For tests of H1a, I gather data from Compustat Quarterly 
for quarterly earnings announcement dates, Compustat for financial statement variables, CRSP for 
stock return variables, Audit Analytics for restatement and material weaknesses variables, and 
Thompson Reuters for institutional ownership variables. For tests of H1b, I also gather data from 
IBES for voluntary disclosure variables. For tests of H1c, I also gather data from DealScan for 
debt financing variables. I use DealScan for my tests of H1c because it captures private debt 
issuances for firms, which are more prevalent than public debt issuances (i.e., public bonds).  
Table 1, Panel B summarizes sample construction for the firm-quarter sample. I merge 
Audit Analytics with Compustat to begin with all 171,225 firm-quarter observations where each 
firm received at least one comment letter from the SEC between 2008 and 2017. Sample selection 
for tests of H1a, H1b, and H1c are presented. I discuss the sample selection procedure for H1a 
alone for brevity. I drop 63,507 firm-quarters missing financial statement variables from 
Compustat, 7,941 firm-quarters missing stock price variables from CRSP, 30,175 firm-quarters 
missing earnings announcement dates from Compustat, and 4,830 firm-quarters missing earnings 
surprise variables from IBES. The final sample for H1a contains 64,772 firm-quarter observations, 
representing 2,262 unique firms. For tests of H1b (H1c), similar procedures yield a final sample 
48,803 (51,606) firm-quarter observations, representing 1,802 (1,898) unique firms.  
--------------- Table 1 --------------- 
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4.2 Main Variable Definitions 
In all hypothesis tests, my main variable of interest is CLQuarter, an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm was working on an SEC comment letter during the fiscal quarter. Specifically, 
from my sample of comment letters, I identify the comment letters written by firms (i.e., where 
the file type is “CORRESP”). I then identify the beginning and end date for each letter. For each 
fiscal quarter during which a firm is required to respond to an SEC comment letter, I set the 
variable CLQuarter equal to 1. If a firm does not respond to an SEC comment letter during a fiscal 
quarter, then I set the variable CLQuarter equal to 0.9 
In H1a, I examine whether earnings announcement timeliness decreases in quarters where 
the firm is answering an SEC comment letter (i.e., where CLQuarter = 1). Here, my dependent 
variable is EALag, which measures the number of days between the quarter end date and the date 
that the firm announced its quarterly earnings. Quarterly earnings announcement timeliness 
decreases as EALag gets larger.  
In H1b, I examine whether voluntary disclosure activity decreases in quarters where the 
firm is answering an SEC comment letter (i.e., where CLQuarter = 1). Here, my dependent 
variable is QtrGuidance, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm voluntarily issued any 
quarterly guidance in the fiscal quarter and equals zero if the firm did not voluntarily issue 
quarterly guidance.10   
 
9 Quarters during which firms respond to a comment letter that is classified as likely to lead to a restatement or 
write-down are excluded from the firm-quarter dataset.  
10 I do not limit forecast activity to current quarter earnings guidance. My hypothesis examines the change in resources 
available for the voluntary disclosure activity. Decreases in the likelihood of any forecast issuance (including sales 
forecasts and forecasts for the subsequent quarter) would support my hypothesis and therefore are not excluded from 
my tests.  
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In H1c, I examine whether debt financing activity decreases in quarters where the firm is 
answering an SEC comment letter (i.e., where CLQuarter =1). For these tests, the dependent 
variable is DebtIssue, an indicator variable that equals 1 if DealScan shows that the firm issued 
debt during the fiscal quarter and equals zero if the firm issued no private debt.  
4.3 Research Design 
I run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with fixed effects to test my hypothesis that 
SEC comment letters divert resources away from other firm activities. For all three firm activities 
(earnings announcement timeliness, voluntary disclosure issuance, and debt issuance), I estimate 
the following fixed effects regression: 
⁡ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑞 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐿𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑞 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸 +
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐹𝐸 + 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                         (1) 
I replace FirmActivity with EALag to test the hypothesis that SEC comment letters draw 
resources away from earnings announcement activities (H1a). CLQuarter is the main independent 
variable of interest, defined above. If firms announce earnings later in quarters when they are also 
responding to an SEC comment letter, then 𝛽1 will be positive. Control variables in the model are 
intended to control for factors that could affect the firm’s earnings annoucnement timeliness and 
the firm’s likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter. I follow Cassel et al. (2013) and control 
for firm characteristics that could affect the likelihood of a firm receiving an SEC comment letter, 
which include firm size (lnassets), stock beta (lagbeta), company age (lnfirmage), auditor quality 
(big4), accounting performance (abschgroa), proxies for financial challenges (losses, specialitems, 
rd, zscore), proxies for firm complexity (foreign, restructuring), proxies for organizational change 
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(assetgrowth, salegrowth, leverage, acquisition), whether the firm restated financial statements 
within the prior two years (restate), and prior year external financing (extfinancing). Due to high 
correlation among some proxies for financial challenges, firm complexity, and organizational 
change, I follow Feng et al. (2009) and conduct a principal component analysis to reduce each set 
of proxies to one factor. The above listed variables have also been shown to influence a firm’s 
earnings announcement timeliness. In addition to these control variables, I control for the quality 
of the firm’s internal controls (mw) (Ettredge, Li, and Sun 2006), whether the firm is an accelerated 
or large accelerated filer (laf), and earnings surprise (surprise) (Chen & Mohan 1994).  
I replace FirmActivity with QtrGuidance to test the hypothesis that SEC comment letters 
draw resources away from voluntary disclosure activities (H1b). Since QtrGuidance is an indicator 
variable, the model is a linear probability model where I model the probability that a firm issues 
guidance in a given quarter. If firms are less likely to issue forecasts in quarters when they are also 
responding to an SEC comment letter, then 𝛽1 will be negative. Similar to the test for H1a, I control 
for firm characteristics that could affect the likelihood of a firm receiving an SEC comment letter. 
In addition, I follow prior literature (e.g., Ajinkya 2005; Feng et al. 2009) and control for variables 
that have been shown to determine firms’ decision to voluntarily disclose guidance. Specifically, 
I control for earnings volatility (earnvol), dispersion among analyst forecasts (disp_analysts), the 
number of analysts following the firm (ln_analysts), and institutional ownership (instown).   
I replace FirmActivity with DebtIssue to test the hypothesis that SEC comment letters draw 
resources away from debt financing activities (H1c). Again, since DebtIssue is an indicator 
variable, the model is a linear probability model where I model the probability that a firm issues 
new debt in a given quarter. If firms are less likely to issue new debt in quarters when they are also 
responding to an SEC comment letter, then 𝛽1 will be negative. Similar to the tests for H1a and 
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H1b, I control for firm characteristics that could affect the likelihood of a firm receiving an SEC 
comment letter. In addition, I follow prior literature (e.g., Xin, Sudipto, and Gilles 2006) and 
control for variables that may determine a firm’s decision to issue debt, the number of analysts 
following the firm (ln_analysts), and institutional ownership (instown), the volatility of stock 
return (retvol), market-to-book ratio (mtb), share turnover (shareto), dividend ratio (divratio), and 
Standard & Poor’s credit rating (sprating).  
In all models, I include quarter fixed effects to control for within-year patterns in the firm 
activity and SEC comment letter receipt. I also include year fixed effects to control for macro-
level events that may affect the firm activity being tested and firm fixed effects to alleviate 
concerns that omitted, unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics could explain any findings. 
As a result, the main source of variation is within-firm switches between quarters with and without 
comment letters.  
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5.0 Main Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the SEC comment letter conversations 
in my sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. On average, 
SEC comment letters take about 67 days and 3 rounds of correspondence to resolve, consistent 
with anecdotal evidence and prior literature which suggests that comment letters take significant 
time to remediate. Further, it appears that SEC comment letters are the responsibility of top 
executives, since the CFO is personally addressed in 60 percent of comment letter conversations, 
and the CEO or CFO is personally addressed in 89 percent of comment letter conversations.  
Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the firm-quarters in the final sample. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Between 2008 and 2017, firms 
must respond to an SEC comment letter in about three percent of all firm-quarters. Further, similar 
to findings in prior literature, the median firm in my sample announces earnings 34 days after the 
quarter-end, firms issue quarterly guidance in 35 percent of all firm-quarters, and firms issue debt 
in about ten percent of all firm-quarters.  
Table 2, Panel C presents the average earnings announcement lag, likelihood of quarterly 
guidance issuance, and likelihood of new debt financing activity during quarters in which the firm 
is responding to an SEC comment letter (i.e., where CLQuarter = 1), compared to the control 
period during which the firm does not responding to an SEC comment letter (i.e., where CLQuarter 
= 0). On average, firms take longer to announce earnings (3.455 versus 3.417), are less likely to 
issue quarterly guidance (0.249 versus 0.292), and are less likely to issue new debt (0.066 versus 
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0.085) when responding to a comment letter than compared to the control period. All differences 
are statistically significant (p value < 0.01), providing initial evidence that firms react to SEC 
comment letters as predicted.  
--------------- Table 2 --------------- 
Table 3 presents correlations among the three dependent variables (EALag, QtrGuidance, 
and DebtIssue), the key independent variable of interest (CLQuarter), and determinants of the 
receipt of a comment letter. Consistent with prior research on SEC comment letters, CLQuarter is 
positively correlated with firm external financing activity (extfinancing), financial challenge 
(finchall), and change in accounting performance (abschgroa) and negatively correlated with 
auditor quality (big4). These significant correlations reinforce the importance of my controlling 
for determinants of a firm receiving an SEC comment letter so that CLQuarter captures the 
additional workload for firms while responding to an SEC comment letter rather than time-variant 
firm characteristics that predict the SEC’s review patterns.  
--------------- Table 3 --------------- 
5.2 Regression Results of H1a 
Table 4 presents regression results for all tests of H1. Column 1 presents the results of a 
fixed effects model, where earnings announcement lag (EALag) is the depending variable (model 
(1)). The results show that CLQuarter is positively associated with EALag, with a coefficient of 
0.012 (two-tailed p=0.002). Stated differently, CLQuarter is associated with a decrease in earnings 
announcement timeliness. This is consistent with firms taking longer to close their quarterly books 
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during quarters when they are also responding to an SEC comment letter, compared to quarters 
when they are not responding to an SEC comment letter.  
As for control variables, as expected, firms’ earnings announcement lag is negatively 
associated with auditor quality (big4) and positively associated with organizational change 
(orgchange), organizational complexity (complexity), financial challenges (finchall), poor 
financial reporting quality (restate), and poor internal control quality (mw).  
5.3 Regression Results of H1b 
Table 4, Column 2 presents the results for my test of H1b. I run a linear probability model 
where quarterly voluntary disclosure (QtrGuidance) is the dependent variable (model (1)). The 
results show that CLQuarter is negative and statistically significant, with a coefficient of -0.018 
(two-tailed p=0.04), suggesting a decrease in the likelihood of voluntary forecast issuance during 
comment letter quarters. This is consistent with firms diverting resources away from voluntary 
forecast issuance activities in order to address the comment letter, even when the SEC comment 
letter does not identify any material accounting issues. 
As for control variables, as expected, firms’ likelihood of issuing quarterly guidance is 
positively associated with analyst following (ln_analysts) and negatively associated with analyst 
forecast dispersion (disp_analysts). Further, quarterly management guidance is more prevalent 
among firms as they get larger (lnassets) and perform better (abschgroa).  
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5.4 Regression Results of H1c 
Table 4, Column 3 presents results for tests of H1c. I run a linear probability model, where 
new debt issuance (DebtIssue) is the dependent variable (model (1)). The results show that 
CLQuarter is negative and statistically significant, with a coefficient of -0.011 (two-tailed p = 
0.04), suggesting a decrease in the likelihood of new debt issuance during comment letter quarters. 
This is consistent with firms diverting resources away from quarterly debt financing activities in 
order to address the comment letter, even when the SEC comment letter does not identify any 
material accounting issues.  
For control variables, as expected, debt financing is more prevalent among larger firms 
(lnassets) with higher credit rankings (sprating) and less prevalent among firms with volatile stock 
market returns (retvol). Further, firms are more likely to issue debt in quarters with better 
performance (abschgroa).  
--------------- Table 4 --------------- 
Overall, the results suggest that, on average, firms divert resources away from other firm 
activities when they receive an SEC comment letter, as evidenced by decreases in earnings 
announcement timeliness, a decreased likelihood of voluntary disclosure, and a decreased 
likelihood of new debt financing during quarters when firms are required to respond to an SEC 
comment letter. In terms of economic magnitude, firms announce their earnings seven percent 
closer to their 10-Q filing date, firms are six percent less likely to issue forecasts, and firms are ten 
percent less likely to issue debt in quarters when they receive a comment letter than in quarters 
with no comment letter. Notably, only comment letters that are unlikely to uncover non-
compliance are included in these analyses. Thus, results are consistent with the comment letter 
itself drawing on firm resources, and not the outcomes of the comment letter. This result suggests 
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that spillover effects of responding to SEC comments also fall on firms whose financial statements 
are in compliance with accounting rules, not just those that are out of compliance. 
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6.0 Cross-sectional Analyses 
In the hypothesis development, I posit that SEC comment letters could increase the 
workload of the CFO and her staff because they are important, they are a large, effortful task, and 
their arrival is relatively unpredictable. I conduct three cross-sectional analyses to exploit variation 
in these characteristics and provide additional support for my hypothesis.  
6.1 Variation in Effort Intensity 
Prior research has shown that there is variation in effort-intensity of comment letter 
remediation, wherein some comment letters take more time and resources to remediate than others. 
I expect less effortful comment letters to have a smaller impact on CFO workload less than more 
effortful letters. Following prior literature (Cassell et al., 2013), I use the number of quarter-days 
the firm spent responding to the SEC comment letter as a proxy for its effort-intensity.11 I 
investigate whether firms are more likely to divert resources away from earnings announcement, 
voluntary forecast disclosure, and debt financing activities when comment letters are more 
effortful (i.e., take more days to resolve). I run model (1), replacing CLQuarter with CLDays as 
the main variable of interest. Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. Columns 1 presents 
results when EALag is the dependent variable. As expected, CLDays is positively associated with 
earnings announcement lag, consistent with more effortful comment letters decreasing earnings 
 
11 This measure excludes days that the SEC spent responding to a firm’s comment letter, since I do not expect firms’ 
CFOs to experience shocks to workload while they wait for the SEC’s response.  
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announcement timeliness. Columns 2 and 3 present results when QtrGuidance and DebtIssue are 
the dependent variables, respectively. As expected, CLDays is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of both voluntary forecast issuance and new debt issuance, consistent with more 
effortful letters decreasing the likelihood that firms engage in these activities.  
--------------- Table 5 --------------- 
6.2 Variation in Accounting Resources 
When firms’ CFOs have excess capacity to absorb the workload of an SEC comment letter, 
then I do not expect CFOs to divert effort away from normal firm activities. To investigate this, I 
proxy for excess capacity by identifying whether a firm has a Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) in 
addition to a CFO. If a firm’s CFO is also the CAO, this indicates that the firm invests relatively 
less in its accounting and finance function, and the CFO might have fewer resources on hand to 
deal with the additional burden of responding to the SEC’s comments. I split the sample into two 
groups: those where the CFO also holds the title of CAO and where the CFO does not. Firms are 
required to disclose the name of their Chief Financial Officer and their Chief Accounting Officer 
on their 10-K Signature page, and I collect these titles using the BoardEx database.12 In about 40 
percent of the firms-years in my sample, the CFO and CAO are the same person.  I run model (1) 
on the subsample where the CFO holds both titles (CFOCAO=1) and where the CFO does not 
(CFOCAO=0). Table 6 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 present results when EALag is the 
 
12 More specifically, firms are required to disclose the name of the individual that is the head of the financial reporting 
function. The exact title of this person changes depending on the firm. While Chief Accounting Officer is the most 
common title, titles such as “Principal Accounting Officer” or “Controller” also exist. If the CFO is also entitled 
“Principal Accounting Officer” or “Controller” then that CFO is coded as also being the CAO.  
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dependent variable, Column 3 and 4 present results when QtrGuidance is the dependent variable, 
and Columns 5 and 6 present results when DebtIssue is the dependent variable. As expected, 
CLQuarter is significantly associated with decreased earnings announcement timeliness, 
decreased likelihood of forecast issuance, and decreased likelihood of debt issuance only in the 
subsample of firms without a CAO in addition to a CFO (Columns 2, 4, and 6). I find no evidence 
that firms divert resources away from other firm activities while responding to an SEC comment 
letter if they have a CAO in addition to a CFO (Columns 1, 3, and 5).  
--------------- Table 6 --------------- 
6.3 Variation in Predictability of Comment Letter Arrival 
If firms are relatively more surprised at the arrival of an SEC comment letter, I expect the 
comment letter to be a larger shock to the workload of the CFO and her team. To investigate this, 
I proxy for relative unpredictability by modelling the likelihood that a firm will receive an SEC 
comment letter in a given quarter following the Cassell et al. (2013) determinants model. Given 
that a firm received a comment letter, I expect more unpredictable SEC comment letters to increase 
workload the most.  
To test this, I generate a variable UnpredictableCL, which equals 1 if the comment letter 
arrived in a quarter during which the predicted likelihood of receiving a comment letter is lower 
than the median value and equals 0 if the predicted likelihood is above the median value. I run 
OLS regressions to explore whether, given a firm receives a comment letter, earnings 
announcement timeliness, voluntary disclosure activity, or debt financing activity are differentially 
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affected by a more unpredictable comment letter. UnpredictableCL is the independent variable of 
interest in these regressions. 
Table 7 presents the results. Column 1 presents results where earnings announcement lag 
(EALag) is the dependent variable. As expected, the coefficient on UnpredictableCL is positive 
and statistically significant, though marginal, with a coefficient of 0.025 (two-tailed p value = 
0.065). This result is consistent with firms delaying earnings announcements more during 
unpredictable comment letters. Column 2 presents the results where quarterly management 
guidance (QtrGuidance) is the dependent variable. The coefficient on UnpredictableCL is 
negative, but not statistically significant. Thus, I find no evidence that more unpredictable 
comment letters differentially impact firms’ likelihood of issuing management guidance. Column 
3 presents the results where debt financing is the dependent variable. As expected, the coefficient 
on UnpredictableCL is negative and statistically significant, with a coefficient of -0.036 (two-
tailed p value = 0.037). This result is consistent with firms’ increased likelihood of diverting 
resources away from new debt financing activity when they receive a more unpredictable comment 
letter than when they receive a less unpredictable comment letter. In all, these results are consistent 
with less predictable comment letters increasing CFO workload more than less predictable 
comment letters. 
--------------- Table 7 --------------- 
Overall, the results of these cross-sectional analyses provide evidence consistent with SEC 
comment letters diverting resources away from other firm activities, and the extent of the effect 
depends on the severity of the comment letter, the excess resources available to the firm’s CFO, 
and to some extent the relative unpredictability of an SEC comment letter.  
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7.0 Additional Analyses 
7.1 Mitigating Spillover Effects Over Time 
To gain more insights into the spillover effects of SEC comment letters on other firm 
activities, I conduct an additional analysis to examine whether firms are able to mitigate the effects 
over time. I identify whether the SEC comment letter is the first that the firm received. Given that 
a firm received a comment letter, its first comment letter conversation may increase workload the 
most. CFOs may find efficiencies in the SEC remediation process and better manage the workload 
shock associated with it over time.  
To test this, I create a variable called FirstCL, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the SEC 
comment letter belongs to the firm’s first comment letter conversation since 2004 and equals zero 
if the comment letter belongs to any subsequent comment letter conversation. I run OLS 
regressions to explore whether, given a firm receives a comment letter, earnings announcement 
timeliness, voluntary disclosure activity, or debt financing activity are differentially affected by 
the firm’s first comment letter. FirstCL is the independent variable of interest in these regressions.  
Table 8 presents the results. Column 1 presents results where earnings announcement lag 
(EALag) is the dependent variable. The coefficient on FirstCL is positive and statistically 
significant, with a coefficient of 0.020 (two-tailed p value = 0.051). This result is consistent with 
firms delaying earnings announcements more during their first comment letter conversation than 
during subsequent comment letters. Column 2 presents the results where quarterly management 
guidance (QtrGuidance) is the dependent variable. The coefficient on FirstCL is negative and 
statistically significant, with a coefficient of -0.054 (two-tailed p value = 0.006). This result is 
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consistent with firms’ increased likelihood of diverting resources away from voluntary disclosure 
activity when they receive the first comment letter than when they receive subsequent comment 
letters. Column 3 presents the results where debt financing is the dependent variable. The 
coefficient on FirstCL is negative, but not statistically significant. Thus, I find no evidence that a 
firm’s first comment letter differentially impacts firms’ likelihood of issuing new debt financing. 
In all, these results are consistent with a firm’s first comment letter increasing CFO workload more 
than subsequent comment letters. This is consistent with the idea that firms make adjustments over 
time to decrease some spillover effects of SEC comment letters. 
--------------- Table 8 --------------- 
7.2 Alternative Explanation 
In additional analyses, I first aim to rule out an alternative explanation. I use Naïve 
Bayesian textual classification to identify the subset of comment letters that are unlikely to uncover 
non-compliance using the same information available to managers at the time of comment letter 
remediation (i.e., comment letter text). One possible concern is that managers are unsure whether 
or not comment letters are unlikely to identify non-compliance, and therefore the arrival of the 
comment letter generates uncertainty. In other words, it is possible that the comment letters in my 
sample have information content. Thus, the arrival of the comment letter updates managers’ 
information regarding their firms’ financial reporting quality. Then, firms may reduce earnings 
announcement timeliness, voluntary forecast activity, or debt issuance because they are reacting 
to the updated information, not because they are responding to a reallocation of firm resources. 
Prior literature has found little evidence of information content in comment letters, especially the 
 38 
comment letters in my sample (i.e., comment letters that are unlikely to identify non-compliance). 
One exception is documented in Dechow, Lawrence, and Ryans (2016); some comment letters in 
which the SEC questions revenue recognition practices trigger insider trading when the firm 
receives the comment letter and trigger a stock market reaction when the comment letter is publicly 
disclosed, suggesting that these comment letters contain information. I remove from my sample 
any comment letters that mention revenue recognition issues. I re-run my main analyses (model 
(1)) using this subsample of comment letters. Results are presented in Table 9. Across all three 
firm activities (earning announcement timeliness, voluntary disclosure issuance, and new debt 
issuance), the main results hold. Specifically, for EALag, the coefficient on CLQuarter is 0.009 
(two-tailed p value < 0.01), for QtrGuidance the coefficient on CLQuarter is -0.011 (two-tailed p 
value < 0.05), and for DebtIssue the coefficient on CLQuarter is -0.010 (two-tailed p value < 0.05). 
In all, the results of this analysis provide comfort that information content is not driving my main 
result. 
--------------- Table 9 --------------- 
7.3 Robustness Tests 
7.3.1 Alternative Model Specification 
In this section, I test whether my main results for guidance issuance and new debt issuance 
hold under an alternative model specification. Given that these two proxies for firm-level activities 
are binary variables, it is possible that a logistic regression is an appropriate model. I present linear 
probability models in my main results for ease of interpretation. To alleviate concerns that my 
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results are driven by model specification, I re-run the analyses where either QtrGuidance or 
DebtIssue is the dependent variable (i.e., where the dependent variable is binary). I run the 
following logistic regression: 
⁡ 𝑃𝑟⁡(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑞 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐿𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑞 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑞 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 +
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟⁡𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  (2) 
The same set of controls that were used in Model (1) (discussed above) are used in Model 
(2). Results (untabulated) are consistent with my main analyses. Specifically, when QtrGuidance 
is the dependent variable, CLQuarter is negative and statistically significant, with a coefficient 
of -0.235 (two-tailed p value = 0.007). When DebtIssue is the dependent variable, CLQuarter is 
negative and statistically significant, with a coefficient of -0.170 (two-tailed p value = 0.058). This 
provides comfort that my main results are not driven by model choice13. 
7.3.2 Alternative Definition of Comment Letters Unlikely to Identify Non-Compliance 
In this section, I test whether my main results hold when I identify comment letters that do 
not uncover non-compliance using actual ex post firm outcomes rather than ex ante predictions 
from the Naïve Bayesian textual classification. One potential downside of the Naïve Bayesian 
textual classification is that the final sample may include SEC comment letters that are unlikely to 
detect non-compliance, but the firm still has a restatement or a write-down in the following year. 
To ensure that these comment letters are not driving my results, I include a comment letter in the 
sample if the comment letter does not require the company to amend or restate prior filings, revise 
 
13 I also re-run all cross-sectional analyses that use QtrGuidance or DebtIssue as a dependent variable. I run model 
(3), replacing the key independent variable of interest and the subsample depending on the cross-sectional analysis. 
Inferences are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to inferences drawn from linear probability models in all cases.  
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future filings, or write down accounts in the year following remediation.  I re-run my main analyses 
(model (1)) using this subsample of comment letters. Results are presented in Table 10. Across all 
three firm activities (earning announcement timeliness, voluntary disclosure issuance, and new 
debt issuance), the main results hold. Specifically, for EALag, the coefficient on CLQuarter is 
0.012 (two-tailed p value < 0.01), for QtrGuidance the coefficient on CLQuarter is -0.009 (two-
tailed p value < 0.05), and for DebtIssue the coefficient on CLQuarter is -0.018 (two-tailed p value 
< 0.01). In all, the results of this analysis provide comfort that the definition of SEC comment 
letter is not driving my main result.   
--------------- Table 10 --------------- 
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8.0 Conclusion 
In this paper, I document evidence consistent with a spillover effect of SEC comment 
letters; firms temporarily decrease earnings announcement timeliness, the likelihood of voluntary 
forecast issuance, and the likelihood of new debt issuance until their comment letters are resolved. 
Since I exclude SEC comment letters that are likely to signal accounting non-compliance, this 
result suggests that the spillover effects of responding to SEC comments also falls on firms whose 
financial statements are in compliance with accounting rules, not just those that are out of 
compliance.  
I complement my main finding with cross sectional analyses to provide further support to 
my hypothesis. I find that the documented main effect is stronger when firms receive more severe 
comment letters, when firms do not have both a CFO and a CAO, and when the arrival of firms’ 
comment letters is less predictable. Overall, my results are consistent with anecdotal evidence 
shared by practitioners such as CFOs, who claim that comment letters are resource intensive and 
become the instant priority of the firm once they arrive, drawing resources away from other 
important activities. 
The results in this paper should be of interest to practitioners and academics alike. Since 
comment letters require firms to make adjustments to their financial reporting only 25 percent of 
the time, the findings in this paper document one potentially unintentional spillover effect of the 
other 75 percent of comment letters. This does not mean that these comment letters are without 
benefit; for example, they may serve as a control mechanism to prevent non-compliance from 
occurring. This study documents a spillover effect of this subset of comment letters, and future 
research can calibrate whether the costs outweigh benefits.  
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Further, this paper documents spillover effects that occur when a firm faces a shock to its 
workload. While prior literature on workload shocks has focused on the CEO, the board of 
directors, and other economic agents, this study focuses on the firm’s accounting and finance 
function. I provide evidence that having a CAO in addition to the CFO could reduce the impact of 
the shocks to the CFO’s function. Future research can identify additional consequences of having 
a separate CAO position or identify additional shocks that trigger resource tradeoff decisions 
within a company’s accounting and finance function. 
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Appendix A Illustrative SEC Comment 
The following is an excerpt from Arbor Realty Trust, Inc.’s response to an SEC comment 
letter. It is dated April 8, 2010. Text in bold is the SEC’s comment. Text in italics is the company’s 
response. The full letter can be accessed via the SEC’s EDGAR system at the following link: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1253986/000095012310008889/filename1.htm. 
 
Form10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 filed August 7, 2009 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements 
Note 6 – Investment in Equity Affiliates 
Lightstone Value Plus REIT L.P. / Prime Outlets, page 20 
 
We note your response to prior comments five and 21. You state that the POM 
transaction involved the exchange of your investments in POM for interests in Lightstone 
Value Plus REIT L.P. as well as a debt arrangement. You also state that the business purpose 
of the transaction was primarily to obtain significant cash flow based on your liquidity needs 
particularly in light of the difficult market conditions. In your response to prior comment 
21, you state that you did not defer any gain related to the exchange. Please tell us your basis 
for recognizing the entire gain amount immediately. Tell us how you considered the debt 
arrangement when determining the timing of the gain recognition since the debt is secured 
by the interest in Lightstone Value Plus REIT L.P. that you received in the exchange. 
 
Company Response: 
The Company evaluated the exchange of its zero basis profits interest in Prime Outlets 
Member LLC (“POM”) in accordance with ASC 845-10 Nonmonetary Transactions. Per 845-10-
30, accounting for nonmonetary transactions should be based on the fair values of the assets 
exchanged. This is the same basis as that used for monetary transactions. When transactions are 
recorded at fair value, a gain or loss is recognized if the book value of the asset surrendered differs 
from its fair value (or the fair value of the asset acquired if it is more clearly evident). The fair 
value of the asset received should be used to measure the cost if it is more clearly evident than the 
fair value of the asset surrendered. Based upon a comparison of the terms and associated cash 
flows of the assets exchanged, the Company determined that the fair value of the common and 
preferred units of Lightstone Value Plus REIT, L.P. (LVP REIT LP) were more readably 
determinable than the value of the profits interest in POM. The determination of the fair value of 
the common and preferred units of LVP REIT LP is discussed in further detail below. 
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The Company also noted that ASC 845-10 only allows for the nonmonetary exchange to be 
measured based on the recorded amount of the nonmonetary asset relinquished, and not on the 
fair values of the exchanged assets, if any of the following conditions apply: 
a) The fair value of neither the asset(s) received nor the asset(s) relinquished is 
determinable within reasonable limits.  
i. The Company was able to determine the value of the units in LVP REIT LLP 
within reasonable limits.  
ii. Please refer to discussion below for such determination. 
b) The transaction is an exchange of a product or property held for sale in the 
ordinary course of business for a product or property to be sold in the same line of 
business to facilitate sales to customers other than the parties to the exchange.  
i. The transaction did not include a product for property held for sale in the 
ordinary course of business. 
c) The transaction lacks commercial substance 
i. The Company’s future cash flows are expected to significantly change as 
the common and preferred units received in LVP REIT LP differs 
significantly from the future cash flows of the POM interest. 
 
Accordingly, the Company concluded that the exchange met the criteria of ASC 845-10 for 
recording the exchange at fair value at the consummation of the exchange. See below for 
discussion of how the Company determined its fair value in the common and preferred units in 
LVP REIT LP. 
 
Upon the closing of the transfer, the Company received the following units in LVP REIT 
LP: 
    Units   Value per Units   Total Value 
Common Units    284,200    $ 10.00     $ 2,842,000   
Preferred Units    53,100    $ 1,000.00     $ 53,100,000   
Total                $ 55,942,000   
 
The preferred operating partnership units yield 4.6316% and the common units are entitled 
to dividends as declared by LVP REIT Inc. The common units were valued at $10 per unit similar 
to common shares offered by LVP REIT Inc. in its prospectus supplement. The common units can 
be converted at any time by the Company for shares in LVP REIT Inc. The preferred units were 
valued at $1,000 per unit. This value is supported by the following: 
 
• The preferred units may be redeemed at the option of LVP REIT LP at a redemption price 
per preferred unit equal to the sum of the liquidation preference (see below, equals the fair 
value of the preferred units at the consummation of the exchange) plus an amount equal to 
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all distributions (whether or not earned or declared) accrued and unpaid thereon to the 
date of redemption, and the redemption price shall be payable in cash. 
• LVP REIT LP has an incentive to redeem the preferred units in June 2013, as following 
that date, the annual distribution rate applicable to the preferred units shall increase from 
4.6316% to 15% percent and the Company would be granted certain consent rights with 
respect to certain actions of LVP REIT LP. 
• Unless such preferred units have previously been redeemed, at the option of the holder 
thereof, any preferred units may be converted, in whole or in part, at any time after June 
2013, into such number of common units obtained by dividing the aggregate preferred unit 
liquidation preference of such preferred units by the estimated fair market value of one 
common share in LVP REIT Inc. 
• In the event of any liquidation, the holders of the preferred units shall be entitled to receive 
$1,000.00 per preferred unit plus an amount equal to all distributions (whether or not 
earned or declared) accrued and unpaid thereon to the date of final distribution to such 
holders. 
 
The Company concluded that no deferral of the gain was appropriate. As LVP REIT LP 
has the usual risks and rewards associated with such asset and the Company has no continuing 
involvement in the transferred asset, the Company concluded that the POM interest had been 
transferred to LVP REIT LP. Further, the Company could not be required or otherwise compelled 
to reacquire the POM interest. 
 
Following this conclusion, the Company considered whether the debt arrangement had 
any impact on whether recording the gain at consummation of the exchange was appropriate. ASC 
845-10 does not directly address situations when the asset transferred is encumbered by debt and 
whether gain deferral would be applicable in such situations. This consideration included an 
evaluation of the terms of the loan and the features of the LVP REIT LP units received by the 
Company. 
 
At the time the Company agreed to transfer its interest in the POM profits interest to LVP 
REIT LP, the Company also entered into a loan agreement with LVP REIT Inc. that was secured 
by its POM interests. This agreement also required that when the Company completed the 
exchange of its POM interests for the LVP REIT LP units, the LVP REIT LP units would then 
replace the POM interest as security for the loan. 
 
The loan proceeds provided to us were available for general corporate purposes and the 
loan contains no financial or other covenants or restrictions whatsoever on our operations or our 
Company. The loan is non-recourse to the Company and is effectively only secured by the 
Company’s units in LVP REIT LP. The loan is due to mature on July 1, 2016 and is prepayable by 
the Company if LVP REIT LP redeems the Company’s units in LVP REIT LP. LVP REIT LP has 
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the right to redeem the preferred units (see above for further discussion of the features of the 
preferred units) held by the Company starting on June 13, 2013. As noted above, if LVP REIT LP 
does not redeem the preferred units held by the Company by that date, the distribution rate on 
such units increases to 15% per annum and the Company would be granted certain consent rights 
with respect to certain actions of LVP REIT LP. It was the Company’s conclusion that such terms 
make it highly likely that LVP REIT LP will redeem the preferred units on or after June 13, 2013. 
These proceeds will then be used by the Company to prepay the loan. 
 
In summary, based on the discussion above, we have concluded that the amount of the gain 
should be based upon the fair value of the LVP REIT LP units received by us and was appropriately 
recorded in its entirety upon the consummation of the exchange in the first quarter of 2009.
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Appendix B Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition [Source] 
Panel A: Key Dependent and Independent Variables 
EALag Natural log of the number of days between the fiscal quarter end and the date the firm announced quarterly earnings [Compustat] 
QtrGuidance An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm issued any quarterly guidance in the fiscal quarter and equals zero if the firm issued no quarterly 
guidance, 0 otherwise [IBES] 
DebtIssue An indicator variable that equals 1 if DealScan shows that the firm issued debt during the fiscal quarter and equals zero if the firm issued no private 
debt, 0 otherwise [DealScan] 
CLQuarter An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm had an unresolved SEC comment letter during the fiscal quarter, 0 otherwise [Audit Analytics] 
CLDays Natural log of the number of days during the quarter that the firm was responding to an SEC comment letter. This measure excludes days between 
the firm’s response and the SEC’s subsequent comment letter within the conversation. [Audit Analytics] 
FirstCL An indicator variable that equals 1 if, during the firm-quarter, the firm responded to an SEC comment letter that belongs to the firm’s first periodic 
comment letter conversation. Variable equals 0 if, during the firm-quarter, the firm responded to an SEC comment letter that belongs to any 
subsequence comment letter conversation. [Audit Analytics] 
Panel B: Determinants of Receiving a Comment Letter 
lnassets Natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets [Compustat] 
lagbeta The firm’s beta coefficient using daily returns in year t-1 [CRSP] 
lnfirmage Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s first appearance in the Compustat or CRSP dataset, whichever is first 
big4 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm was audited by a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise [Compustat] 
abschgroa Absolute value of the firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to year t (earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets) [Compustat] 
finchall The first principal component of four proxies for firm financial challenges: 1) losses, 2) special items, 3) research and development expense, and 
4) Z-Score. [Compustat] 
complexity The first principal component of two proxies for firm complexity: 1) foreign, and 2) restructuring [Compustat] 
orgchange The first principal component of four proxies for org. change: 1) asset growth, 2) revenue growth, 3) leverage, and 4) acquisition [Compustat] 
restate An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm had a misstatement in year t that leads to a restatement in the future, 0 otherwise [Audit Analytics] 
extfinancing Following Hoitash, Hoitash, & Kurt (2016), an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s external financing ratio was above 0.05 in year t-1, 0 
otherwise [Compustat] 
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Variable Name Definition [Source] 
Panel C: Determinants of 10-Q Filing Lag (in addition to determinants previously defined in Panel B) 
mw An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm had an internal control material weakness in quarter q, 0 otherwise [Audit Analytics] 
acclacc An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is an accelerated or large accelerate filer, 0 otherwise 
surprise Actual quarter EPS less the mean analyst expectation immediately before quarter end [IBES] 
Panel D: Determinants of the Decision to Forecast (in addition to determinants previously defined in Panels A – B) 
earnvol Standard deviation of earnings (scaled by assets) during the previous 28 quarters, with a minimum of 3 quarters required. [Compustat] 
disp_analysts  Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts during firm-quarter q [IBES] 
ln_afollowing Natural log of the number of unique analysts that followed the firm in the year before quarter q [IBES] 
instown Herfindahl index calculated as the sum of squared institutional ownership [ISS] 
Panel E: Determinants of the Decision to Issue Debt (in addition to determinants previously defined in Panels A – C) 
retvol Standard deviation of stock return during quarter t using monthly returns [CRSP] 
mtb Market-to-book ratio [Compustat] 
shareto Median value of monthly shared traded during quarter q, divided by shares outstanding over a quarter [Compustat] 
divratio Ratio of dividends to total assets [Compustat] 
sprating An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has a Standard and Poor’s debt rating, 0 otherwise [Compustat] 
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Tables 
Table 1 Sample Selection Criteria for Main Hypothesis Tests 
Panel A: Construction of SEC Comment Letters Conversations Dataset   
  
Comment Letter Conversations 
SEC Comment letter conversations that refer to forms 10-K or 10-Q in years 2008 – 2017  10,055 
      Less: Letters classified as “likely to identify non-compliance” using Naïve Bayesian textual classification (3,647) 
SEC Comment letter conversations that are unlikely to identify non-compliance  6,408 
 
Unique Firms in SEC Comment letters conversations dataset  
 
3,728 
 
Panel B: Construction of Firm-Quarter Panel Dataset 
   
 
Observations 
Tests of H1a 
Observations 
Tests of H1b 
Observations 
Tests of H1c 
Merge SEC Comment letters with Compustat to get all firm quarters from 2008 - 2017  171,225 171,225 171,225 
     Drop: Firm-quarters missing control variables from Compustat (63,507) (63,514) (64,240) 
     Drop: Firm-quarters missing control variables form CRSP (7,941) (7,934) (13,586) 
     Drop: Firm-quarters missing earnings announcement variables from Compustat (30,175)   
     Drop: Firm-quarters missing control variables from IBES (4,830) (22,098) (12,450) 
     Drop: Firm-quarters missing control variables from ISS  (28,876) (29,343) 
Final Firm-Quarter, Panel Dataset* 64,772 48,803 51,606 
Unique Firms in Final Firm-Quarter, Panel Dataset 2,262 1,802 1,898 
*Sample sizes deviate from these numbers in final regressions because singleton observations are dropped in fixed effects models 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for SEC Comment Letter Conversations in Audit Analytics 
Variable N mean median std min max 
Days to Resolve 6,408 66.87 47 62.20 6 371 
Rounds to Resolve 6,408 2.60 2 0.876 2 6 
CFO Addressed 6,408 0.600 1 0.490 0 1 
CFO / CEO Addressed 6,408 0.893 1 0.309 0 1 
First SEC Conversation 6,408 0.301 0 0.459 0 1 
       
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Firm-Quarters in the Sample 
Variable N mean median std min max 
Dependent Variables 
EALag 64,772 34.07 32 13.186 11 59 
QtrGuidance 48,803 0.351 0 0.477 0 1 
DebtIssue 51,606 0.103 0 0.304 0 1 
Independent Variable of Interest 
CLQuarter 64,772 0.031 0 0.380 0 1 
Control Variables 
Lnassets 64772 7.217 7.110 1.765 1.933 12.21 
lagbeta 64772 1.357 1.301 0.559 -0.240 3.191 
lnfirmage 64772 3.033 2.996 0.708 1.099 4.357 
big4 64772 0.865 1 0.341 0 1 
abschgroa 64772 0.0138 0.006 0.028 0.000 0.380 
finchall 64772 -0.217 -0.455 1.029 -3.168 5.628 
complexity 64772 0.180 -0.060 1.155 -0.993 2.358 
orgchange 64772 0.099 0.060 0.746 -3.096 11.25 
restate 64772 0.088 0 0.284 0 1 
extfinancing 64772 0.242 0 0.338 0 1 
mw 64772 0.056 0 0.229 0 1 
surprise 64,772 0.007 0.010 0.237 -2.233 1.110 
earnvol 48,803 0.031 0.017 0.052 0.001 0.827 
disp_analysts 48,803 0.041 0.020 0.061 0 1.200 
ln_afollowing 48,803 1.949 1.946 0.778 0 3.912 
instown  48,803 0.717 0.746 0.211 0.000 1.097 
retvol 51,606 0.025 0.021 0.015 0.007 0.118 
mtb 51,606 2.134 1.640 1.559 0.444 18.50 
shareto 51,606 0.620 0.475 0.520 0.001 3.433 
divratio 51,606 0.001 0 0.002 0 0.031 
sprating 51,606 0.417 0 0.493 0 1 
       
Panel C: Difference in Means between Comment Letter Quarters and Non-Comment Letter Quarters 
Variable CLQuarter=0 CLQuarter=1 Difference P-value 
LnEAlag 3.417 3.455 0.038 0.000 
QtrGuidance 0.292 0.249 -0.044 0.000 
DebtIssue 0.085 0.066 -0.019 0.003 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) CLQuarter 1.000 
            
 
(2) EALag 0.040 1.000 
           
 
(3) QtrGuidance -0.018 -0.130 1.000 
          
 
(4) DebtIssue -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 1.000 
         
 
(5) lnassets -0.014 -0.217 -0.018 0.166 1.000 
        
 
(6) lagbeta 0.009 0.063 0.032 -0.051 -0.226 1.000 
       
 
(7) lnfirmage -0.037 -0.134 -0.107 0.076 0.444 -0.193 1.000 
      
 
(8) big4 -0.026 -0.134 0.031 0.061 0.332 -0.057 0.087 1.000 
     
 
(9) abschgroa 0.016 0.098 -0.043 -0.031 -0.205 0.087 -0.089 -0.064 1.000 
    
 
(10) finchall 0.027 0.173 0.029 -0.093 -0.488 0.316 -0.300 -0.118 0.153 1.000 
   
 
(11) complexity -0.015 -0.059 0.129 0.016 0.173 0.042 0.094 0.099 -0.079 0.116 1.000 
  
 
(12) orgchange 0.019 0.012 0.105 -0.020 -0.099 0.033 -0.240 -0.067 -0.045 -0.003 -0.073 1.000 
 
 
(13) restate 0.006 0.082 0.023 -0.010 -0.091 0.051 -0.096 -0.027 0.022 0.086 -0.006 0.020 1.000  
(14) extfinancing 0.030 0.144 -0.063 -0.022 -0.162 0.192 -0.217 -0.083 0.112 0.240 -0.123 0.259 0.023 1.000 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations for the main independent variable of interest, three dependent variables used to test H1, and determinants of whether 
a firm receives an SEC comment letter in a given firm-quarter. Variables in bold are significant at the p<0.05 level. All variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 Main Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable EALag QtrGuidance DebtIssue 
CLQuarter 0.012*** -0.018** -0.011** 
 (3.059) (-2.014) (-2.046) 
lnassets -0.016*** 0.031** 0.025*** 
 (-3.487) (2.389) (7.710) 
lagbeta -0.003 -0.011 -0.017*** 
 (-1.136) (-1.493) (-6.782) 
lnfirmage -0.021 0.047 -0.000 
 (-1.483) (1.177) (-0.012) 
big4 -0.015* 0.008 -0.005 
 (-1.837) (0.342) (-0.936) 
abschgroa 0.056 0.243*** 0.132*** 
 (1.629) (3.627) (3.143) 
finchall 0.010*** -0.007 0.003* 
 (4.974) (-1.335) (1.935) 
complexity 0.009*** -0.009 -0.002 
 (3.891) (-1.638) (-1.104) 
orgchange 0.006*** 0.007 -0.001 
 (2.737) (1.207) (-0.753) 
restate 0.042*** 0.009 -0.000 
 (6.589) (0.515) (-0.082) 
extfinancing 0.005 -0.004 -0.014 
 (1.003) (-0.326) (-0.584) 
mw 0.066***   
 (9.266)   
acclacc -0.014***   
 (-2.902)   
surprise -0.033***   
 (-7.585)   
earnvol  -0.120  
  (-1.508)  
disp_analysts  -0.357***  
  (-7.481)  
ln_analysts  0.018** -0.005** 
  (2.042) (-2.185) 
instown  0.058* 0.004 
  (1.879) 0.360 
retvol   -0.191** 
   (-2.178) 
mtb   -0.002** 
   (-2.142) 
shareto   0.007*** 
   (2.725) 
divratio   -0.719* 
   (-1.837) 
sprating   0.045*** 
   (9.475) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 64,757 48,787 51,593 
Adjusted R-sq 0.690 0.589 0.090 
Table 4 presents the results of the main tests for my hypothesis. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** mark coefficients that are significant at two-tailed p<0.10, p<0.05, 
and p<0.01, respectively. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions 
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Table 5 Comment Letter Effort Intensity Cross Sectional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable EALag QtrGuidance DebtIssue 
CLDays 0.005*** -0.008** -0.005* 
 (3.003) (-2.105) (-1.922) 
lnassets -0.016*** 0.031** 0.025*** 
 (-3.486) (2.389) (7.709) 
lagbeta -0.003 -0.011 -0.017*** 
 (-1.133) (-1.494) (-6.783) 
lnfirmage -0.021 0.047 -0.000 
 (-1.481) (1.177) (-0.013) 
big4 -0.015* 0.008 -0.005 
 (-1.835) (0.342) (-0.938) 
abschgroa 0.056 0.243*** 0.132*** 
 (1.631) (3.628) (3.141) 
finchall 0.010*** -0.007 0.003* 
 (4.977) (-1.338) (1.931) 
complexity 0.009*** -0.009 -0.002 
 (3.889) (-1.636) (-1.103) 
orgchange 0.006*** 0.007 -0.001 
 (2.740) (1.207) (-0.754) 
restate 0.042*** 0.009 -0.000 
 (6.591) (0.515) (-0.083) 
extfinancing 0.004 -0.004 -0.014 
 (1.002) (-0.326) (-0.586) 
mw 0.066***   
 (9.265)   
acclacc -0.014***   
 (-2.903)   
surprise -0.033***   
 (-7.582)   
earnvol  -0.120  
  (-1.507)  
disp_analysts  -0.357***  
  (-7.481)  
ln_analysts  0.018** -0.005** 
  (2.042) (-2.184) 
instown  0.058* 0.004 
  (1.877) (0.012) 
retvol   -0.002** 
   (-2.143) 
mtb   0.007*** 
   (2.726) 
shareto   -0.720* 
   (-1.840) 
divratio   0.045*** 
   (9.477) 
sprating   -0.191** 
   (-2.176) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 67,757 48,787 51,593 
Adjusted R-sq 0.701 0.604 0.093 
Table 5 presents the results of Model (1), except CLDays is the main variable of interest. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** mark coefficients that are significant 
at two-tailed p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.
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Table 6 CFO Excess Resources Cross Sectional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cross Section CFOCAO = 0 CFOCAO = 1 CFOCAO = 0 CFOCAO = 1 CFOCAO = 0 CFOCAO = 1 
Dependent Variable EALag EALag QtrGuidance QtrGuidance DebtIssue DebtIssue 
       
CLQuarter 0.007 
(0.130) 
0.017*** 
(5.08) 
-0.008 
(0.950) 
-0.014** 
(-2.140) 
 
-0.009 
(-1.49) 
 
-0.017** 
(-2.32) 
       
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 41,791 22,644 30,267 18,427 31,814 19,623 
Adj. R-sq 0.736 0.682 0.577 0.639 0.094 0.102 
 
Table 6 presents the results of regressions of EALag, QtrGuidance, and DebtIssue on CLQuarter on subsamples of firms where the CFO does and does not 
also hold the title of CAO. All regressions include the same control variables used in the main analysis. All regressions include firm, year, and quarter fixed 
effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** mark coefficients that are significant at two-tailed 
p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. Refer to Appendix B for variable names and definitions. 
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Table 7 Unpredictability Cross Sectional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable EALag QtrGuidance DebtIssue 
UnpredictableCL 0.025* -0.015 -0.036** 
 (1.85) -0.56 (-2.12) 
lnassets -0.236*** -0.14 0.020*** 
 (-4.19) -1.23 (3.15) 
lagbeta 0.018* 0.053** -0.008 
 (1.75) 2.22 (-0.73) 
lnfirmage -0.034*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-3.74) 0.04 (0.06) 
big4 -0.040** 0.037 -0.016 
 (-2.06) 0.94 (-1.05) 
abschgroa 0.156 -0.226 0.185 
 (0.880) -0.55 (0.78) 
finchall 0.015** 0.014 0.002 
 (2.45) 1.10 (0.36) 
complexity 0.003 0.019 0.002 
 (0.47) 1.60 (0.38) 
orgchange 0.004 0.041*** -0.003 
 (0.67) 3.57 (-0.77) 
restate 0.044** 0.114** -0.038** 
 (2.19) 1.97 (-2.51) 
extfinancing 0.034** -0.082** 0.012 
 (2.08) -2.18 (0.63) 
mw 0.089***   
 (2.99)   
acclacc -0.079***   
 (-5.12)   
surprise -0.032*   
 (-1.90)   
earnvol  -0.396*  
  -1.87  
disp_analysts  -0.569***  
  -3.64  
ln_analysts  0.117*** 0.000 
  5.80 (0.05) 
instown  -0.013 0.059** 
  -0.24 (2.51) 
retvol   0.322 
   (0.88) 
mtb   -0.004* 
   (-1.71) 
shareto   -0.001 
   (-0.13) 
divratio   0.420 
   (0.18) 
sprating   0.26* 
   (1.67) 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 3,409 2,765 2,891 
Adjusted R-sq 0.531 0.230 0.067 
Table 7 presents the results of regressions of FirmActivity on UnpredictableCL. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** mark coefficients that are significant at two-
tailed p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 8 Learning Over Time Additional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable EALag QtrGuidance DebtIssue 
FirstCL 0.020* -0.054*** -0.005 
 (1.952) (-2.770) (-0.503) 
lnassets -0.015*** -0.015 0.019*** 
 (-3.239) (-1.559) (4.402) 
lagbeta 0.009 0.022 -0.001 
 (1.100) (1.244) (-0.113) 
lnfirmage -0.038*** -0.021 -0.005 
 (-4.765) (-1.221) (-0.708) 
big4 -0.031* 0.032 0.002 
 (-1.817) (1.029) (0.251) 
abschgroa 0.097 0.074 0.316** 
 (0.750) (0.312) (2.072) 
finchall 0.024*** 0.008 -0.002 
 (4.793) (0.723) (-0.375) 
complexity 0.004 0.018* 0.002 
 (0.921) (1.946) (0.440) 
orgchange -0.003 0.036*** -0.001 
 (-0.505) (3.583) (-0.280) 
restate 0.072*** 0.043 -0.012 
 (4.573) (1.385) (-0.909) 
extfinancing 0.016 -0.064*** -0.001 
 (1.345) (-2.715) (-0.055) 
mw 0.095***   
 (4.880)   
acclacc -0.059***   
 (-4.503)   
surprise -0.027**   
 (-2.310)   
earnvol  -0.349***  
  (-2.871)  
disp_analysts  -0.894***  
  (-5.871)  
ln_analysts  0.103*** -0.010 
  (7.006) (-1.587) 
instown  0.067 0.042** 
  (1.459) (2.498) 
retvol   -0.121 
   (-0.449) 
mtb   -0.004** 
   (-2.493) 
shareto   0.006 
   (0.710) 
divratio   0.341 
   (0.251) 
sprating   0.031*** 
   (3.098) 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 7,117 7,300 7,639 
Adjusted R-sq 0.216 0.211 0.046 
Table 8 presents the results of regressions of FirmActivity on FirstCL. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** mark coefficients that are significant at two-
tailed p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions 
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Table 9 Excluding Comment Letters with Information Content 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable EALag QtrGuidance DebtIssue 
CLQuarter 0.009*** -0.011** -0.010** 
 (1.994) (-2.558) (-2.046) 
lnassets -0.016*** 0.030** 0.025*** 
 (-3.325) (2.250) (7.645) 
lagbeta -0.004 -0.011 -0.017*** 
 (-1.264) (-1.443) (-6.722) 
lnfirmage -0.022 0.049 -0.001 
 (-1.500) (1.238) (-0.144) 
big4 -0.016** 0.006 -0.006 
 (-1.963) (0.241) (-1.118) 
abschgroa 0.054 0.241*** 0.131*** 
 (1.540) (3.468) (3.024) 
finchall 0.011*** -0.006 0.003 
 (5.038) (-1.134) (1.618) 
complexity 0.009*** -0.009* -0.001 
 (3.814) (-1.763) (-0.727) 
orgchange 0.006*** 0.007 -0.001 
 (2.873) (1.291) (-0.760) 
restate 0.041*** 0.012 -0.002 
 (6.361) (0.681) (-0.372) 
extfinancing 0.005 -0.005 -0.013 
 (1.089) (-0.467) (-0.524) 
mw 0.065***   
 (9.121)   
acclacc -0.015***   
 (-2.993)   
surprise -0.033***   
 (-7.621)   
earnvol  -0.127  
  (-1.568)  
disp_analysts  -0.350***  
  (-7.338)  
ln_analysts  0.017** -0.005** 
  (1.973) (-2.020) 
instown  0.054*  
  (1.757)  
retvol   -0.193** 
   (-2.135) 
mtb   -0.002** 
   (-2.004) 
shareto   0.007*** 
   (2.654) 
divratio   -0.720* 
   (-1.784) 
sprating   0.045*** 
   (9.150) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 62,416 46,968 49,685 
Adjusted R-sq 0.689 0.588 0.090 
Table 9 presents regressions of FirmActivity on ClQuarter and relevant control variables. Comment letters that 
have information content are removed. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm 
level. *, **, and *** mark coefficients that are significant at two-tailed p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. 
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Table 10 Ex post Classification of Comment Letters 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable EALag QtrGuidance DebtIssue 
CLQuarter_expost 0.012*** -0.009** -0.018*** 
 (4.176) (2.168) (-3.304) 
lnassets -0.015*** 0.033** 0.027*** 
 (-3.129) (2.467) (5.799) 
lagbeta -0.004 -0.011 -0.015*** 
 (-1.359) (-1.435) (-4.682) 
lnfirmage -0.021 0.048 -0.005 
 (-1.464) (1.196) (-0.411) 
big4 -0.016* 0.008 -0.011 
 (-1.884) (0.333) (-1.194) 
abschgroa 0.054 0.242*** 0.159*** 
 (1.601) (3.557) (3.140) 
finchall 0.010*** -0.007 0.001 
 (4.992) (-1.291) (0.499) 
complexity 0.009*** -0.009 -0.002 
 (3.912) (-1.595) (-0.891) 
orgchange 0.006*** 0.007 -0.003 
 (2.791) (1.251) (-1.359) 
restate 0.042*** 0.011 -0.003 
 (6.518) (0.618) (-0.514) 
extfinancing 0.005 -0.003 0.011 
 (1.001) (-0.307) (0.318) 
mw 0.064***   
 (8.700)   
acclacc -0.018***   
 (-3.578)   
surprise -0.030***   
 (-6.949)   
earnvol  -0.128  
  (-1.568)  
disp_analysts  -0.342***  
  (-7.341)  
ln_analysts  0.015* -0.005 
  (1.765) (-1.513) 
instown  0.047 0.003 
  (1.563) (0.246) 
retvol   -0.116 
   (-0.966) 
mtb   -0.001 
   (-0.995) 
shareto   0.006* 
   (1.726) 
divratio   -1.738*** 
   (-2.814) 
sprating   0.037*** 
   (4.352) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 64,466 48,714 51,456 
Adjusted R-sq 0.693 0.588 0.092 
Table 10 presents an additional analysis, where CLQuarter is replaced with CLQuarter_expost.  Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** mark coefficients that are 
significant at two-tailed p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
